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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TONYIA B. JENSEN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
) ' 
-vs- " ) Case No. 11458 
) 
CLARK EVON JENSEN, ) 
• ) • : 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMEMT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce proceeding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Honorable George E. 
Ballif, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, who decreed 
that both parties were entitled to a decree of divorce, that the 
defendant was entitled to the care, custody and control of the 
minor children, subject to plaintiff's visitation rights, and 
that the property of the parties, both personal and real, be 
divided equally between them as set forth in the Decree of 
Divorce. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the lower court's decree of divorce with 
instructions to award the real and personal property to the 
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defendant and appellant on a more equitable basis as contended 
for by the appellant herein. In the alternative, to reverse 
the decree of divorce of the lower court and grant to defendant 
and appellant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this divorce action were married in 
1954. During the period of their marriage, the parties lived 
together until the 26th day of May, 1974, at which time the 
plaintiff left the home of the parties voluntarily. The parties 
remained separated for approximately 18 months and the divorce 
was granted on December 3, 1975. During the marriage, the 
parties were both employed regularly. The plaintiff's income 
through 1973 was $60,040.85. (Tr.51). The defendant's income 
through 1973 was $174,374.59. (Tr.51). The marriage produced 
three children, the custody of which was awarded to the defen-
dant, subject to the right of the plaintiff to visit with said 
children at reasonable times and places. 
The assets of the parties were comprised primarily of 
real estate in the American Fork area, including a home with 7 
acres of property valued at a total of approximately $120,000.00, 
and a duplex valued at $32,500.00, the latter property being 
subject to mortgages. (Tr.41). 
The court granted each party a decree of divorce on the 
following grounds: 
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"The court finds that the marriage between the 
parties has deteriorated because of the differ-
ence in interests and goals which have developed 
between the parties over the past years, and that 
the differences in the plaintiff's seeking work 
outside the home and the defendant demanding 
domestic obedience and service from her have 
caused mental and physical anguish and suffering 
to both parties entitling each to a decree of 
divorce from the other." 
Further, the court, in the Decree dated December 3, 
1975, distributed the property of the parties as follows: 
"(a) A home located in Highland, Utah, at Rt. #1, 
Box 156-9, which is hereby awarded to the plaintiff 
and defendant in equal interests, subject to the 
right of the defendant to acquire the plaintiff's 
one-half interest in the home as set forth hereafter. 
"(b) Certain real property consisting of approxi-
mately seven (7) acres surrounding the above re-
ferenced home and upon which said home is located, 
which is hereby awarded to the plaintiff and the 
defendant in equal interests, provided, however, 
that the defendant shall have the option of acquir-
ing the plaintiff's one-half interest in the home 
and the 7 acre lot, by paying the sum of $50,000.00 
cash forthwith, or he may pay said sum over a ten 
(10) year period at an annual rate of not less 
than $5000.00, which may be made in monthly install-
ments or a single payment. Said payment or payments 
shall bear no interest except that in the event the 
defendant fails to make a yearly payment or any part 
thereof, the unpaid delinquent sum shall carry inter-
est at a rate of ten (10%) percent per annum. Further, 
the defendant, if he elects to have payments on a 
monthly basis, will be entitled to a thirty (30) day 
grace period, but will be required to have all pay-
ments met by the end of each year. The plaintiff is 
entitled to have a lien against the property for the 
amount of her interest. 
"(c) The plaintiff, TONYIA B. JENSEN, is hereby awarded 
the following specific property: 
1. A 1974 Comet automobile. 
2. Beehive Savings Account. 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. That certain duplex located in the City of 
American Fork, subject to certain mortgages. 
4. Food storage and meat of the parties. 
5. Savings bonds of the parties. 
"(d) The defendant, CLARK EVON JENSEN, is hereby awarded 
the following specific property: 
1. Household furniture, appliances and tools. 
2. A 1970 Chevrolet vehicle. 
3. A 19 75 Volkswagon. 
4. Water stock. 
5. John Hancock Insurance. 
6 .' Silver coins . 
7. Camper for pickup. 
8. Boat and motor. 
9. Two horses of the parties. 
10. The following insurance policies should also be 
awarded to the defendant: Ideal Insurance Com-
pany; Beneficial Life; G.I. Insurance; John 
Hancock Family Plan; American Western Insurance 
group plan through defendant's work; American 
National Family Plan. Defendant should name 
the minor children as beneficiaries on said 
policies during the period of their minority." 
(Tr.18 and 19) . 
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to have the 
court open the judgment filed on December 3, 1975, and take addi-
tional testimony of the defendant and the plaintiff for the pur-
pose of modifying the decree of divorce with respect to the pro-
perty distribution. (Tr.ll). The defendant's motion for a new 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial was denied January 26, 1976, after hearing of oral argu-




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PROPERTY AND 
CASH TO THE PLAINTIFF IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 
FIFTY (50%) PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PROPERTY AC-
QUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING THEIR MARRIAGE. 
It is well settled that the trial court has wide latitude 
of discretion in adjusting the financial and property rights of 
the parties; however, this discretion is not without limitations. 
In the case of Derose v. Derose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P2d 221 (1967), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"We remain cognizant of the prerogatives of the 
trial court and the latitude of discretion it is 
properly allowed in divorce cases. But the dis-
cretion is not without limit, nor immune from 
correction on review, if that is warranted. Due 
to the seriousness of such proceedings and to the 
vital effect they have on people's lives, it is 
also the responsibility of this court to carefully 
survey what is done and while the determinations 
of the trial court are given deference and not 
disturbed lightly, changes should be made if that 
seems essential to the accomplishment of the de-
sired objectives of the decree: that it is to make 
such an arrangement in property and economic re-
sources of the parties that they will have the best 
opportunities to reconstruct their lives on a happy 
and useful basis for themselves and for their child-
ren. An important consideration in this regard is 
the elimination or minimizing of potential frictions 
or difficulties in the future." 
( Underlining added.) 
It is conceded that the division of the marital property 
is perhaps the most difficult task which the court is required to 
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perform. To aid in this division, however, courts have devised 
a "one-third to the wife - two-thirds to the husband" general 
rule. In the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 
P2d 192 (1967), the Supreme Court sustained the decree of the 
lower court which had awarded to the defendant husband two-thirds 
of the net marital estate and one-third to the plaintiff wife. 
The factual similarities of the Anderson case are significant. 
In that case both parties were awarded or had grounds for divorce. 
The trial judge held a "taut rein" at the trial,concerning him-
self only with various factors bearing upon the financial situa-
tion of the parties in reaching a solution to the property distri-
bution. The parties were married for a long period of time and 
had raised their children. The court specifically held: 
"The court has sustained the one-third, two-thirds 
property division used by the trial court in the 
present case, without regard to which party was 
granted the divorce." 
See also Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P2d 743 (1948); 
Griffen v. Griffen, 18 Utah 98, 55 Pac. 84 (1898). 
The very recent case of Cox v. Cox, 532 P2d 994 (1975), 
involved a divorce action in which the trial court divided the 
net assets belonging to the parties one-third to the wife and 
the remaining two-thirds to the husband defendant. This court, 
in affirming the lower court's award, said: 
"Because of the variableness and complexities 
involved in family troubles there is no firm 
rule or formula that can be uniformly applied 
in all cases in legal surgery necessary to sever-
ing such relationships which will best serve the 
desired objectives of allocating the economic 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
resources so that the parties involved can 
reconstruct their lives in the most happy 
and useful manner. However, as an aid in 
that endeavor, in the past the courts have 
often resorted to a general "rule of thumb" 
of one-third to the wife and two-thirds to 
the husband; and that is what the court appears 
to have done here. Upon our survey of the cir-
cumstances of these parties we see no reason 
to believe that the application of that general 
formula is so inequitable or unjust that we 
should interfere therewith." 
In addition to the general principle of law announced 
by this court in the Anderson and Cox cases aforesaid, the 
Supreme Court has set forth certain principles which govern 
the division of property in the State of Utah in divorce actions. 
In the case of Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P2d 265, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
"Plaintiff sets out the elements which should 
be taken into consideration by the court as 
governing its discretion in coming to a con-
clusion as to a property settlement: (1) The 
amount and kind of property owned by each of 
the parties; (2) whether the property was 
his before coveture or accumulated jointly; 
(3) the ability and opportunity of each to earn 
money; (4) the financial condition and neces-
sities of each party; (5) the health of the 
parties; (6) the standard of living of the 
parties; (7) the duration of the marriage; 
(8) what was given up by each party to the 
marriage; (9) what age were they when married." 
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P2d 977 (1956), 
the Supreme Court further established as a principle to be con-
sidered by the trial court in effecting a property distribution, 
"considerations relative to the children of the parties." 
Applying the principles set forth in the Anderson, Cox, 
Pinion, and Wilson cases to the facts of the present case, 
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defendant submits that the trial court erred in dividing the 
property equally between the parties. 
The facts of the present case show that the parties 
were married in 1954. During their marriage, some twenty years 
before separation, there is no evidence that the parties were 
having marital difficulties. In May of 1974, the plaintiff left 
the home of the parties. The testimony indicates that the plain-
tiff had a gross earnings of $980.00 per month from the American 
Fork Hospital and earnings of approximately $35.00 per month 
from the Utah State Training School in American Fork. (Tr.18 and 
29-30). The plaintiff had lived separately from the defendant 
during the 18 month period prior to the entry of the decree of 
divorce and during that time had been able to save an average 
of $106.00 per month. (Tr.26). Further, the plaintiff had estab-
lished a savings account with the Beehive Credit Union and had 
increased that account by the sum of $800.00 since the separation 
of the parties and had also established a savings account at 
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association and had completely 
funded said savings account with $4,100.00 during the period of 
separation. (Tr.27). Further, the plaintiff had invested in a 
mobile home and was capable of paying for the mobile home and 
at the time of the divorce was making application for approval 
of a loan for purchasing a home. (Tr.28). Thus, the testimony 
is clear that the plaintiff, through her training and employ-
ment was capable of supporting herself and was, in fact, self-
-8-
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supporting and not in need of any assistance from the defendant. 
The plaintiff's cumulative earnings through 19 73 amounted to 
$60f040.85. (Tr.51). It is interesting to note that the plain-
tiff's reported income for the years 1972 and 1973 was in ex-
cess of $10,500.00 each year. (Tr.51). Further, the plaintiff 
testified that she made a gross earnings of approximately 
$980.00 from the American Fork Training School which would 
give her an annual gross of $11,760.00, together with an 
approximate $35.00 per month earning, or an additional $420.00, 
for a total annual earnings of $12,180.00. On the other hand, 
the defendant's income for the years 1972 and 1973 was 
$14,343.40 and $16,769.53, respectively. (Tr.51). Defendant's 
present income is less than the amount he reported in 19 7 3 
and he currently makes a net wage of approximately $900.00 
per month. (Tr.16). Defendant's drop in income is occasioned 
by his having terminated one of the two jobs he was working 
in order to take care of the children. 
The plaintiff testified that from the inception of 
the marriage she had been employed and had contributed to the 
income of the parties. On cross examination plaintiff was 
asked as to her willingness to give up her present employment 
and return to the family. She stated in essence, that she 
was not willing to give up her whole life to comply with her 
husband's and family's wishes. The plaintiff further testified, 
on cross examination, that for a period of one year and greater, 
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the divorce action had been pending, during which time she had 
been invited several times to return to the home, but that she 
refused to do so and that all efforts by her husband, the defen-
dant, for reconciliation had failed. (Tr.22). 
The defendant testified that the plaintiff had volun-
tarily left him to keep the company of a third female friend, 
and that in spite of his efforts to have her return to the home 
and to make the marriage work, she refused, giving numerous ex-
cuses, including schooling, and that she would never make an 
attempt at reconciliation. The defendant further testified that 
his wife, the plaintiff, had not attended to the duties of the 
home in respect to cleaning and caring for the home, cooking for 
the children, and generally taking care of the children. (Tr.47-48). 
Further, the daughter of the parties, Charlotte, corroborated the 
testimony of the defendant, that her mother had not attended to 
the household duties, had ignored her responsibility to cook and 
care for the home and the children, and was not in her opinion a 
dutiful mother. Further, the daughter of the parties, Charlotte, 
testified that she had been attending to the duties of taking 
care of the household chores, cooking and caring for the children 
for a period of nine years. (Tr.49-51). The latter testimony is 
uncontroverted, that the defendant, together with his daughter, 
Charlotte, had taken all of the responsibility, or substantially 
all of the responsibility, in caring for the household and the 
children. 
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In light of this testimony, and the evidence adduced 
at the trial, the defendant contends that the court abused its 
discretion by giving the plaintiff an equal share in the total 
marriage assets of the parties. The defendant contends that the 
court did not consider the relative guilt or innocence of the 
parties and the considerations relative to the children. Nor 
did the court give consideration to the ability of the parties 
or earn money to support themselves nor was consideration given 
to the financial condition and necessities of each party. The 
ultimate result of the decree as it stands will be to force the 
defendant to sell the homestead of the parties and move his 
family to a different location, disrupting their lives to the 
extent that they will be removed from their friends, environ-
ment, and the schools and classes which they are accustomed to 
and which are important to children of their ages. The defen-
dant's option to purchase plaintiff's interest is a practical 
impossibility based upon the income which he has demonstrated 
he makes. His only alternative is to be forced to sell the 
property inasmuch as the plaintiff, as a co-owner, can insist 
upon the cash equivalent of her interest. Such a result does 
not reflect consideration for the needs of the children, either 
as to their need to stay in the present environment to which 
they are accustomed, or their need to have adequate support 
from their father, nor does the decision reflect the considera-
tion that the plaintiff left her husband for pursuits of her 
own, to satisfy her own interests and is largely at fault in 
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this case. Nor does the decision reflect the consideration 
that the plaintiff is capable of supporting herself and has 
adequate income in excess of her expenses to the extent that 
she has accumulated over $6000.00 in savings in a period of 
18 months and is fully capable of taking care of herself with-
out fifty percent of the assets or value of the marital estate. 
Nor does the decision reflect the consideration that the defen-
dant's financial condition and necessities is much greater than 
that of the plaintiff by reason of his obligation to support and 
care for the children totally out of his own funds without con-
tribution from the plaintiff. 
The defendant testified that his income amounted to a 
net $9 00.00 per month. Of that income, the defendant would have 
to pay to the plaintiff approximately $416.00 in satisfaction of 
the $5000.00 annual requirement and would be left with less than 
$500.00 for his living expenses, including expenses for caring 
for the children and maintaining the household. The defendant 
is incapable of making the payment to his wife and satisfying 
the monthly obligations which he presently has. Thus, his alter-
native would be to sell the premises, liquidate his estate, and 
attempt to find other accommodations more comfortable to his 
family and his income. It is defendant's contention that this 
works a hardship on the family, upon himself, and represents an 
injustice and abuse of discretion in light of the fuctual evi-
dence produced at the trial which would indicate that the plain-
tiff is not entitled to one-half of the marital estate. As the 
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court found, the plaintiff is capable of sustaining herself 
and is not entitled to alimony and her needs are certainly 
not as great as that of the defendant and plaintiff's family. 
Thus, the defendant seeks that this court determine a more 
equitable and fair division of the property of the marriage 
which would be least allow the defendant to remain in the 
premises acquired during the marriage and relieve the defen-
dant of his obligation to pay $5000.00 annually for ten years 
to the plaintiff. Defendant maintains that it is a more fair 
and reasonable distribution of the marital assets to allow 
him to keep the home and three and one-half acres of the real 
property surrounding the home and would urge the court to 
modify or instruct that the decree be modified to that extent. 
Certainly, in light of the cases cited herein, de-
fendant's contention that he ought to be entitled to the home 
and three and one-half acres of the real property is not incon-
sistent. On the basis of the facts of this case established 
by the evidence adduced at trial, the one-third, two-thirds 
formula for distribution of the marital estate should have 
been followed by the trial court and its failure to do so was 
abusive and not in the interest of justice and fairness to 
the parties. In fact, defendant maintains that the court 
took a position contrary to the rule announced in the Anderson 
and Cox cases in announcing that it had adopted the principle 
of "equal distribution of the proceeds of acquisitions during 
the marriage", (Tr.18) and that the court was very reluctant 
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and resistant to accept any evidence adduced or attempted to be 
adduced by the defendant or his witnesses to overcome the said 
adopted principle. Thus, defendant contends and maintains that 
this court can appropriately sit in review and make the deter-
mination that the estate be divided according to the principles 
announced in the Pinion, Anderson, and Cox cases. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
On the 10th day of December, 1975, the defendant caused 
to be filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59 states, interalia: 
"(a) Grounds. Subject to the provision of Rule 
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law, or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: ..... (6) insufficiency 
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law, (7) error 
in law." 
The defendant's motion for a new trial was supported by 
a memorandum of points and authorities wherein he indicated that 
it was his intention to have the court open the trial for the 
taking of additional evidence regarding the issues pertinent to 
distribution of the marital estate such as the relative fault of 
the parties, the financial needs and conditions of the parties, 
-14-
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the ability of the parties to earn separate livings comfortably, 
the considerations relative to the children, the money and pro-
perty they possessed and how it was acquired, etc. 
Defendant's motion for a new trial was premised upon 
subparagraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 59 as quoted hereinabove. De-
fendant has heretofore in this brief established the general 
principle followed by this court in the recent case of Cox v. 
Cox and the earlier case of Anderson v. Anderson. That rule 
in essence is that a trial court, although granted a generous 
amount of discretion in determining property distributions in 
divorce actions, nevertheless is to be limited by the principle 
that the estate ought to be divided along the lines of two-
thirds to the husband and one-third to the wife. The recent 
case of Leftwich v. Leftwich, _____ P2d ______ (19 76) , although 
not following the principle announced in the Cox and Anderson 
cases, does not overrule said cases and the principle stands. 
Defendant maintains that the one-third, two-thirds principle 
is clearly applicable in his case based upon the facts and 
the evidence of the case. Thus, defendant contends that the 
court's discretion was exercised in such manner as to be against 
law and that the resulting decision was entered upon insufficient 
evidence to support it. Defendant clearly established the basis 
for his motion for a new trial and has and did demonstrate that 
the motion was meritorious and firmly couched in subparagraphs 
6 and 7 of Rule 59. Nonetheless, the trial court denied the 
-15-
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motion for new trial and did not permit the defendant to produce 
the additional evidence which defendant feels could have mater-
ially influenced the court's decision and have resulted in a 
distribution which would have permitted him to keep the homestead 
of the parties together with the three and one-half acre parcel 
that he was awarded. In effect, the defendant believed that he 
would be capable of persuading the court through additional 
evidence to relieve him of the obligation to buy his wife's 
equity interest in the home. 
CONCLUSION 
This court has announced the general principle, in the 
Anderson and Cox cases, that marital assets should be distribu-
ted one-third to the wife and two-thirds to the husband. The 
Supreme Court has also announced that the trial court should 
consider elements relative to the amount and kind of property 
owned by each of the parties, whether the property was accumu-
lated jointly, the ability and opportunity of each of the parties 
to earn money, the financial condition and necessities of each 
party, the health of the parties, the standard of living of 
the parties, the duration of the marriage, what was given up 
by each party by the marriage, considerations relative to the 
children, and the money and property that the parties possess 
and how it was acquired. Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 
P2d 265, and Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P2d 977. 
Although the trial court is granted a broad discretion in 
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determining the distribution of marital assets in divorce 
actions, in the instant case, the discretion was abused for 
the reason that the court had before it ample evidence which 
would support its finding and concluding that the plaintiff 
was not entitled to an equal distribution of the marital 
estate of the parties but that the defendant should be awarded 
a greater portion thereof. Particularly, the defendant main-
tains that it is well within the principles announced by this 
court in the cases aforesaid that he be relieved of his obli-
gation to purchase his wife's equity interest in the home, 
and that if he is not relieved of said obligation the decision 
of the trial court constitutes an injustice to him in that he 
will be required to sell said home and remove his family to a 
more affordable accommodation* Defendant maintains that the 
evidence clearly demonstrates that the parties did not make 
an equal contribution to the marriage and that the plaintiff 
made a substantially smaller contribution toward the house-
hold, marriage, and acquisition of monies and assets. Thus, 
defendant urges the court to reverse the decision of the 
trial judge with respect to the distribution of the marital 
assets and remand the case with instructions that the distri-
bution be made such as to allow the defendant to retain pos-
session of the home of the parties and be relieved of his 
obligation to purchase the plaintiff's equity interest. 
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Further, the defendant maintains that his motion for 
new trial was well founded on subparagraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 59 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the court's 
denial of the motion for a new trial was error. Defendant 
alternatively urges the court to reverse the decision of the 
trial court with respect to the distribution of the marital 
assets and remand same to the trial court for the purpose of 
hearing additional testimony with regard to issues relative 
to making a determination of an appropriate distribution of 
the marital assets. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARY H. WEIGHT 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Tel: 373-4912 
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